Egypt. Air Flight 9. Wikipedia. Egypt. Air Flight 9. 90. SU- GAP, the aircraft involved in the accident, at D. Kennedy International Airport, New York City, New York, United States. Find great deals on eBay for air jordan 1990 air jordan 1991. Shop with confidence. Motor Vehicles and the 1990 Clean Air Act Background The Clean Air Act of 1970 set a national goal of clean and healthy air for all. Destination. Cairo International Airport, Cairo, Egypt. Egypt. Air Flight 9. MS9. 90/MSR9. 90) was a regularly scheduled flight from Los Angeles International Airport, United States, to Cairo International Airport, Egypt, with a stop at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York City. On 3. 1 October 1. Boeing 7. 67 operating the route crashed into the Atlantic Ocean about 6. Nantucket Island, Massachusetts, killing all 2. As the ECAA lacked the resources of the much larger American National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Egyptian government asked the NTSB to handle the investigation. Two weeks after the crash, the NTSB proposed handing the investigation over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as the evidence suggested that a criminal act had taken place and that the crash was intentional rather than accidental. This proposal was unacceptable to the Egyptian authorities, and hence the NTSB continued to lead the investigation. As the evidence of a deliberate crash mounted, the Egyptian government reversed its earlier decision and the ECAA launched its own investigation. The two investigations came to very different conclusions: the NTSB found the crash was caused by deliberate action of the relief first officer Gameel Al- Batouti. The aircraft, a stretched extended- range version of the standard 7. It was delivered to Egypt. Air as a brand new aircraft on 2. September 1. 98. 9. Captain El- Habashi was a veteran pilot who had been with Egypt. Air America (1990) - Duration: 1:25:06. Olympia Pettitt 3,009 views. 1:25:06 Air America Flying Men Flying Machines - Duration: 1:26:37.Air for more than 3. Relief First Officer Al- Batouti had close to 5,2. Egypt. Air designated one crew as the . While there was no formal procedure specifying when each crew flew the aircraft, it was customary for the active crew to make the takeoff and fly the first four to five hours of the flight.
The cruise crew then assumed control of the aircraft until about one to two hours before landing, at which point the active crew returned to the cockpit and assumed control of the aircraft. Egypt. Air designated the captain of the active crew as the pilot- in- command or the commander of the flight. The command first officer initially protested, but eventually agreed. Of the people on board, 1. American, 8. 9 were Egyptian (7. Canadian, and 7 were of other nationalities. Four were non- revenue Egypt. Air crew members. After the crash, newspapers in Cairo were prevented by censors from reporting the officers' presence on the flight. Kennedy International Airport used the JFK Ramada Plaza to house relatives and friends of the victims of the crash. Due to its similar role after several aircraft crashes, the Ramada became known as the . The airspace is divided into . Transatlantic commercial air traffic travels via a system of routes called North Atlantic Tracks, and Flight 9. North Atlantic Track Zulu. There are also a number of military operations areas over the Atlantic, called . After takeoff, Flight 9. At 0. 1: 4. 4, the transponder indicated that Flight 9. FL3. 30. Three minutes later, the controller requested that Flight 9. A pilot on Flight 9. This was the last transmission received from the flight. At 0. 6: 5. 4, the ATC controller tried notifying Flight 9. ARINC attempted to contact Flight 9. SELCAL, also with no response. The controller then contacted a nearby aircraft, Lufthansa Flight 4. Flight 9. 90, but they were unable to make radio contact, although they also reported they were not receiving any emergency locator transmitter signals. Air France Flight 4. Flight 9. 90, but that crew reported nothing out of the ordinary. Center also provided coordinates of Flight 9. Coast Guard rescue aircraft. The first officer repeated . Did you shut the engines? The first officer replies . The final recorded words are the captain repeatedly stating, . There were no other aircraft in the area. There was no indication that an explosion occurred on board. The engines operated normally for the entire flight until they were shut down. From the presence of a western debris field about 1,2. NTSB concluded that the left engine and some small pieces of wreckage separated from the aircraft before water impact. Because the government did not have the resources to salvage the aircraft, the Egyptian government requested that the United States lead the investigation. The Egyptian government signed a letter formally ceding responsibility of investigating the accident to the United States. At 0. 3: 0. 0 EST, an HU- 2. Falcon jet took off from Air Station Cape Cod, becoming the first rescue party to reach the last known position of the plane. Coast Guard cutters in the area were immediately diverted to search for the aircraft, and an urgent marine information broadcast was issued, requesting mariners in the area to keep a lookout for the downed aircraft. At sunrise, the United States Merchant Marine Academy training vessel T/V Kings Pointer found an oil sheen and some small pieces of debris. Rescue efforts continued by air and by sea, with a group of U. S. Coast Guard cutters covering 1. October with the hope of locating survivors, but no bodies were recovered from the debris field. Eventually most passengers were identified by DNA from fractured remains recovered from the debris field and the ocean floor. Atlantic Strike Team members brought two truckloads of equipment from Fort Dix, New Jersey, to Newport, Rhode Island, to set up an incident command post. Officials from the United States Navy and the U. S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) were dispatched to join the command. The search and rescue operation was suspended on 1 November 1. The U. S. Navy rescue and salvage ship. USS Grapple (ARS- 5. U. S. Navy fleet ocean tug. USNS Mohawk (T- ATF- 1. NOAA survey ship. NOAAS Whiting (S 3. The flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were recovered within days by the U. S. Navy's Deep Drone III submersible. In total, a C- 1. Hercules, an H- 6. HU- 2. 5 Falcon, and the U. S. Coast Guard cutters USCGC Monomoy (WPB- 1. USCGC Spencer (WMEC- 9. USCGC Reliance (WMEC- 6. USCGC Bainbridge Island (WPB- 1. USCGC Juniper (WLB- 2. USCGC Point Highland (WPB- 8. USCGC Chinook (WPB- 8. USCGC Hammerhead, along with their supporting helicopters, participated in the search. At the request of the Egyptian government, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) took the lead in this investigation, with the Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA) participating. The investigation was supported by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States Coast Guard, the US Department of Defense, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Egypt. Air, and Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Engines. Egyptian government officials protested, and Omar Suleiman, head of Egyptian intelligence, traveled to Washington to join the investigation. In his statement to British authorities, he claimed to have knowledge of the circumstances behind the crash of Flight 9. He is reported to have said that he wanted to . According to Taha, hours before the flight, Al- Batouti was demoted by an Egypt. Air executive who was on board the plane. As the Egyptian investigation forwarded various mechanical failure scenarios, they were each tested by the NTSB and found not to match the factual evidence. The NTSB concluded that no mechanical failure scenario either they or the Egyptians could come up with matched the evidence on the ground, and that even if mechanical failure had been experienced, the 7. The accident airplane's nose- down movements did not result from a failure in the elevator control system or any other airplane failure. The accident airplane's movements during the initial part of the accident sequence were the result of the relief first officer's manipulation of the controls. The accident airplane's movements after the command captain returned to the cockpit were the result of both pilots' inputs, including opposing elevator inputs where the relief first officer continued to command nose- down and the captain commanded nose- up elevator movements. From the NTSB report Probable Cause section: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the Egypt. Air flight 9. 90 accident is the airplane's departure from normal cruise flight and subsequent impact with the Atlantic Ocean as a result of the relief first officer's flight control inputs. The reason for the relief first officer's actions was not determined. ECAA investigation and conclusion. The ECAA report concluded that . It seemed to me that they knew very well that their man, Batouti, had done this. They were pursuing a political agenda that was driven by the need to answer to their higher- ups in a very pyramidal, autocratic political structure. The word had been passed down from on high, probably from Mubarak himself, that there was no way that Batouti, the co- pilot, could have done this. For the accident investigators in Egypt, the game then became not pursuing the truth but backing the official line. The theories proposed by Egyptian authorities were tested by the NTSB, and none were found to match the facts. For example, an elevator assembly hardover (in which the elevator in a fully extended position sticks because the hinge catches on the tail frame) proposed by the Egyptians was discounted because the flight recorder data showed the elevator was in a . No scenario that the Egyptians came up with, or that we came up with, in which there were some sort of mechanical failure in the elevator control system, would either match the flight profile or was a situation in which the airplane was not recoverable. The speculation, in part, was based on leaks from an unnamed federal law enforcement official that the crew member in the co- pilot's seat was recorded as saying, . I put my faith in God's hands.
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